Silver and Old: How EMTALA\u27s Outdated Appropriate Medical Screening Standard Impacts the Aging Population by Uekawa, Madisyn
 863 
Silver and Old: How EMTALA’s Outdated  
Appropriate Medical Screening Standard  
Impacts the Aging Population 
Madisyn Uekawa* 
Is it “theoretically or practically possible for a 
misdiagnosed condition to be properly stabilized”?1 
ABSTRACT 
With the U.S. elder population on the brink of booming, attention to 
the ramifications of legal standards that affect them is a must. In 2018, the 
Sixth Circuit split from its sister circuits and solidified an interpretation of 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act’s (EMTALA) 
“appropriate medical screening” standard that will adversely affect aging 
individuals. Since older adults are the most likely demographic to use 
emergency care services, laws that impact emergency care will inevitably 
trickle down to this group of people. To protect already vulnerable older 
adults, EMTALA should be modified in such a way that (1) it eliminates 
interpretations such as the “improper motive” standard that the Sixth 
Circuit enforces and (2) gross deviation from the standard of care will 
constitute a “failure to provide appropriate medical screening”—and give 
rise to a cause of action under EMTALA. 
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 1. Jack E. Karns, Hospital Screening Procedures and the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA): Proof of “Improper Intent” Not Necessary in Failure to Stabilize Cases, 
9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 355, 366 (2000). 
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INTRODUCTION 
You arrive at the emergency room. Your neck has been causing you 
problems and you have been experiencing dizziness, including “a spinning 
sensation, difficulty sleeping, nausea, vomiting, and a headache that 
worsen[s] with movement.”2 You have been seeing a chiropractor for the 
last year and believe the visits led to your injuries. 
It is finally your turn to see the ER doctor. Dr. Craig Reynolds treats 
you and notes that your symptoms include high blood pressure, elevated 
white blood cell count, the presence of red blood cells in urine, the 
presence of a fever, and dizziness with a worsening headache. You receive 
no further imaging, tests, or other diagnostic studies. Dr. Reynolds 
prescribes you medicine and tells you to “take it easy.” Then, you are 
discharged. 
You learn later that your symptoms were consistent with vertebral 
dissection, which is known to result from excessive chiropractic 
manipulation of the neck. But Dr. Reynolds did not screen you for that 
                                                     
2. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., No. 1:17-CV-00374, 2017 WL 4535714, at *1 (W.D. 
Mich. July 19, 2017), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 439 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Elmhirst v. 
McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 139 S. Ct. 325 (2018).  
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condition. Since your discharge, your symptoms have worsened. You have 
a stroke, and you are back at the hospital four days later. This time, Dr. 
Roger Gietzen, a neurologist, treats you. 
Dr. Gietzen tells you that you suffered from a stroke caused by 
vertebral dissection. Dr. Piyush Patel, an internist at the hospital, verifies 
this assessment and identifies the chiropractic manipulation as a potential 
underlying cause.3 
You have no federal remedy—but you should. 
Although Congress designed the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (EMTALA or the Act) to be a nondiscriminatory statute4 for 
emergency treatment5 rather than a federal medical malpractice statute,6 
individuals should be allowed to bring a suit under EMTALA if their ER 
screening is wildly deficient. Under EMTALA, hospitals have a duty to 
appropriately screen and stabilize patients that enter the emergency 
department—regardless of their ability to pay.7 EMTALA establishes a 
private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(a).8 Within a 
two-year statute of limitations,9 an individual may bring a civil action 
against a Medicare-participating hospital (nearly 98% of hospitals fall into 
this category)10 if he or she suffers as a direct result of that hospital.11 
While hospitals can be held liable under EMTALA under five general 
scenarios, this Comment will focus on one particular scenario: the failure 
to appropriately screen a patient for an emergency medical condition that 
is within the hospital’s capabilities to treat.12 
The standard for “appropriate medical screening” in the Sixth Circuit 
splits from the majority and moves in a harmful direction by requiring 
                                                     
 3. The introduction derives facts from Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 726 Fed. Appx. 439 
(6th Cir. 2018). 
 4. Sai Balasubramanian, Examining the Impacts of Current Malpractice Frameworks and 
EMTALA on Emergency Medicine, 41 NOVA L. REV. 181, 201 (2017). 
 5. Hadley Hamilton & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., et al., A Look Behind the Closed Doors of the 
Emergency Room - A Medical/Legal Perspective, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 3 (2011) (defining 
“emergency treatment” as “a medical specialty that focuses on the rapid assessment and diagnosis of 
acute illnesses and injuries followed by the stabilization and management of the patient”). 
 6. See Sara Rosenbaum, The Enduring Role of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act, 32 HEALTH AFF. 2075, 2078 (2013). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2018). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (2018). 
 9. EMTALA Fact Sheet, AM. COL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/life-as-a-
physician/ethics--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/FX4H-PQW9]. 
 10. Balasubramanian, supra note 3, at 201. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (2018). 
 12. Michael J. Frank, Tailoring EMTALA to Better Protect the Indigent: The Supreme Court 
Precludes One Method of Salvaging a Statute Gone Awry, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 195, 203–
04 (2000) (discussing other scenarios, including the failure to stabilize a patient before transferring, 
the failure to appropriately transfer a patient, refusal to accept a transferred patient, and delay of 
screening, stabilization, or transfer in order to inquire about a patient’s ability to pay). 
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plaintiffs in an EMTALA claim to allege that a hospital acted with an 
“improper motive” in the failure to appropriately screen them.13 Instead, 
the standard should move to include some component of negligence. 
Because of the rapidly aging population, elderly patients will be the largest 
demographic who will be affected by the laws and remedies governing the 
ER. Thus, to further protect the high volume of elderly patients who 
especially need appropriate care, grossly deficient medical screening 
should equate to the failure to screen under EMTALA and thus give rise 
to a cause of action. 
This Comment contains four parts. First, this Comment will explain 
the majority rule regarding EMTALA’s “appropriate medical screening.” 
Second, it will address the Sixth Circuit’s split from other circuits, which 
is most recently demonstrated in Elmhirst v. McLaren Northern 
Michigan.14 Third, it will illustrate the negative impact an “improper 
motive” standard would have on the aging population. Fourth, it will 
propose a statutory revision to EMTALA’s appropriate medical screening 
prong. 
I.  MAJORITY RULE FOR EMTALA’S APPROPRIATE MEDICAL 
SCREENING REQUIREMENT 
Across federal courts, the majority rule for alleging inappropriate 
medical screening reflects EMTALA’s purpose of nondiscrimination: the 
requirement of uniform treatment.15 More specifically, a plaintiff must 
allege (1) that he or she received a different examination than would have 
been offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms and (2) as a 
result of this disparate screening, the hospital failed to identify an 
emergency medical condition and he suffered harm as result.16 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) delineates the screening requirement EMTALA 
imposes, which requires hospitals to provide “appropriate medical 
screening examination[s]” that are within the capability of the hospital’s 
emergency department to treat.17 
Circuits have been opposed to implementing a motive requirement 
and have directly criticized the Sixth Circuit’s outlier interpretation and 
reasonings for the “improper motive” component. More specifically, the 
                                                     
 13. See generally Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 726 Fed. Appx. 439 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 14. Id. 
 15. E.g., Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 16. See, e.g., Sanders v. Legacy, 676 F. App’x 709 (9th Cir. 2017); Power v. Arlington Hosp. 
Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he plain language of [EMTALA] requires a hospital to 
develop a screening procedure designed to identify such critical conditions that exist in symptomatic 
patients and to apply that screening procedure uniformly to all patients with similar complaints.”) 
(quoting Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879 (1992)). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018). 
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D.C. Circuit, First Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and Fourth 
Circuit conflict with the Sixth Circuit. 
The D.C. Circuit regards the motive for inappropriate screening as 
unimportant. In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., the court 
abided by the majority rule and evaluated whether the screening the 
plaintiff received was a departure from the treatment that a similarly 
situated patient would receive.18 The court expressly stated that “any 
departure from standard screening procedures constitutes inappropriate 
screening” and further noted that “[t]he motive for such departure is not 
important.”19 
Moreover, the First Circuit in Correa v. Hospital San Francisco 
reiterated the same idea. The court here laid out the majority rule that 
“[t]he essence of [EMTALA’s screening] requirement is that there be 
some screening procedure, and that it be administered even-handedly,”20 
and outwardly rejected any motive requirement by stating that “regardless 
of motive, a complete failure to attend a patient who presents a condition 
that practically everyone knows may indicate an immediate and acute 
threat to life can constitute a denial of an appropriate medical screening 
examination under section 1395dd(a).”21 
A particularly direct critique of the Sixth Circuit’s “improper 
motive” is from the Eighth Circuit. In Summers v. Baptist Medical Center 
Arkadelphia, the Eighth Circuit stated, “[w]e cannot agree [with the Sixth 
Circuit] that . . . evidence of improper motivation is essential.”22 Further, 
the court demonstrated that the statute does not require any type of 
motivation and concluded that the statute imposes a strict-liability 
standard—that is, the hospital is liable if it fails to provide appropriate 
medical screening, regardless of what the motivation was for the failure.23 
Thus, in the Eighth Circuit (like many others), a plaintiff need not 
demonstrate any level of intent on the part of the hospital; rather, the 
plaintiff must show only that the hospital failed to provide an appropriate 
medical screening examination in accordance with the majority uniform 
treatment rule.24 
The Tenth Circuit also demonstrates distaste for the “improper 
motive” requirement and has firmly stated that no motive is attached to 
EMTALA liability.25 In Phillips v. Hillcrest Medical Center, Phillips went 
                                                     
 18. Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Correa v. Hosp. S. F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 21. Id. at 1193. 
 22. Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 23. Id. at 1137–38 
 24. Id. at 1143. 
 25. See Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 798 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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to the ER and complained of severe chest pain and pneumonia-like 
symptoms.26 After his examination, the physicians gave him two 
prescription medications and discharged him.27 A few days later, his father 
brought him to a different ER.28 The doctors at this ER confirmed that 
Phillips was suffering from bacterial endocarditis, and he died a few days 
later as a result of the infection.29 
Although the court held that no EMTALA claim existed due to the 
lack of evidence that the ER deviated from EMTALA’s uniform treatment 
requirement, the court stated, “This circuit, like many others, does not 
require any particular motive for EMTALA liability to 
attach[;] . . . EMTALA looks only at the participating hospital’s actions, 
not motives.”30 Like the Eighth Circuit in Summers, the Tenth Circuit 
interprets EMTALA as imposing a strict-liability standard.31 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit directly rejects the improper motive. In 
Power v. Arlington Hospital Association, a patient came into the ER 
because she was suffering from pain in her left hip, her lower left 
abdomen, and her back running down her leg; she also was experiencing 
shaking, difficulty walking, and severe chills.32 Most importantly, she had 
a sizeable boil that was visible on her cheek.33 The emergency nurses and 
physicians did not note the boil on their records during her first visit and 
merely prescribed her pain medication.34 The only diagnostic test the 
doctors administered was a urine test before discharging her.35 When she 
returned to the emergency room the next day, she was diagnosed with 
suffering from septic shock and was admitted into the intensive care unit.36 
She remained in the intensive care unit for four months and during that 
time she had been on life support, had both legs amputated, lost eyesight, 
and suffered severe and permanent lung damage.37 According to a medical 
expert, if she had received appropriate medical screening (including a 
blood test) upon her first visit, then her infection would likely have been 
detected and properly treated.38 
                                                     
 26. Id. at 794. 
 27. Id. at 794–95. 
 28. Id. at 795. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 798. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 853 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 33. Id. at 854. 
 34. Id. at 854–55. 
 35. Id. at 855. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 855–56. 
2020] Silver and Old 869 
The Fourth Circuit held that a jury could conclude that the care given 
to Power deviated from that given to other similar patients.39 Moreover, 
the Power court rejected Arlington Hospital Association’s argument—
which cites Cleland v. Bronson Healthcare Group, Inc. in the Sixth 
Circuit—that the plaintiff had to prove the existence of an improper motive 
on the part of the hospital in its failure to appropriately screen.40 The court 
reasoned that (1) nothing in the statute itself requires an improper motive 
on the part of the hospital as a prerequisite to recovery; (2) the motive 
requirement is much too expansive; and (3) the issue with proving the 
existence of an improper motive.41 Further, the court concluded that 
“having to prove the existence of an improper motive . . . would make a 
civil EMTALA claim virtually impossible,” naming this issue as “the most 
fundamental problem with the motive requirement.”42 
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S “IMPROPER MOTIVE” STANDARD 
The story in the introduction is derived from the facts of Elmhirst v. 
Northern Michigan,43 but the court in Elmhirst directly applied precedent. 
More specifically, the court relied entirely on Cleland v. Bronson Health 
Care Group, Inc., which was decided in the early 1990s.44 
In Cleland, the plaintiffs took their teenage son, who was 
complaining of cramps and vomiting, to the ER.45 The doctors diagnosed 
him with influenza and discharged the teen four hours later.46 However, 
the doctors’ diagnosis was incorrect; the teen was suffering from 
intussusception, a condition that occurs when a part of the intestine 
telescopes within itself.47 In less than twenty-four hours, he suffered from 
cardiac arrest and died.48 
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a claim under 
EMTALA regarding to the hospital’s failure to appropriately screen.49 The 
court reasoned that in addition to not alleging a departure screening,50 they 
failed to allege a motive.51 The court interpreted “appropriate” 
                                                     
 39. Id. at 856. 
 40. Id. at 857. 
 41. Id. at 857–58. 
 42. Id. at 858. 
 43. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich., 726 F. App’x 439 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 44. Id.; see Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 45. Id. at 268. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 269. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 272. 
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in § 1395dd(a) to “refer to the motives with which the hospital acts.”52 
Furthermore, the court in Cleland suggested that indigency, lack of 
insurance, race, sex, ethnic group, politics, occupation, education, 
personal prejudice, drunkenness, and spite are all possible improper 
motives resulting in the hospital’s liability under EMTALA.53 
The Supreme Court overruled the “improper motive” standard for the 
stabilization duty in Cleland in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.54 In 
Roberts, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected its use because there was 
no such implication in the text of EMTALA.55 The court found “no support 
for such a [motive] requirement in the text of the statute.”56 The Supreme 
Court in this case also noted the “appropriate medical screening” circuit 
split: 
The question of the correctness of the Cleland court’s reading 
of § 1395dd(a)’s “appropriate medical screening” requirement is not 
before us, and we express no opinion on it here. But there is no 
question that the text of § 1395dd(b) does not require an 
“appropriate” stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require 
an improper motive. 
 This fact is conceded by respondent, which notes in its brief that 
“the ‘motive’ test adopted by the court below . . . lacks support in any 
of the traditional sources of statutory construction.”57 
When Elmhirst appealed the dismissal of her EMTALA claim, the 
appellate court applied the de novo standard of review.58 The Sixth Circuit 
found that the district court properly dismissed her complaint for failing to 
allege an improper motive and directly applied Cleland.59 But as 
mentioned in Power, the court creates an impossible burden of proof for a 
plaintiff to meet. Moreover, the court in Elmhirst justified its interpretation 
in an effort to distinguish a cause of action under EMTALA’s § 1395dd(a) 
from state-law medical malpractice claims.60 Although the Supreme Court 
denied Elmhirst’s petition for certiorari,61 a circuit split still exists—and 
Elmhirst pushes the interpretation of “appropriate” in the wrong direction. 
                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 250 (1999). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 253. 
 58. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich., 726 F. App’x 439, 441 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S. 
Ct. 325 (2018). 
 59. Id. at 440–41. 
 60. Id. at 442. 
 61. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 139 S. Ct. 325 (2018). 
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The modernization of EMTALA can work to improve the quality of 
emergency care.62 Outside commenters agree that an “improper motive” 
requirement should not be necessary for an EMTALA cause of action, and 
legislation revisions to make EMTALA more effective is the best route.63 
Jack Karns particularly showed disappointment in the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision to derive an “improper motive” retirement: 
With all due respect to the Sixth Circuit, this is not the point of 
EMTALA. The Act is designed to protect patients who are critically 
injured by allowing hospitals to have screening and transfer decision 
procedures applied on a uniform basis. The scenario suggested by 
consideration of a proper or improper motive is not relevant in 
rendering an opinion for a case properly brought under EMTALA. 
The Sixth Circuit’s claim that the Cleland [sic] decision, if decided 
in any other manner, would effectively allow EMTALA to become a 
federal remedy for medical malpractice, is an overstatement because 
the statutory boundaries were clearly delineated in both the Act and 
by those who sponsored the legislation.64 
Karns went on to make an incredible point: “Accordingly,” he states, 
“the court pointed out that EMTALA does not require doctors to conduct 
an appropriate medical screening in order to render a correct diagnosis, but 
rather that ‘they are charged with the duty [to] stabiliz[e] a patient’s 
condition as’ presented to them.”65 He then closed his idea by saying, 
“This statement raises the rather interesting question as to whether it is 
theoretically or practically possible for a misdiagnosed condition to be 
properly stabilized.”66 
The improper motive requirement is not a good one, and even courts 
within the Sixth Circuit do not uniformly agree with it. In Burd v. Lebanon 
HMA, the court criticized but followed the Sixth Circuit’s unique improper 
motive requirement and granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence of such 
motive.67 
                                                     
 62. See generally Katharine Van Tassel, Modernizing the Emergency Medical Treatment & 
Labor Act to Harmonize with the Affordable Care Act to Improve Equality, Quality and Cost of 
Emergency Care, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131 (2015). 
 63. See Judith L. Dobbertin, Eliminating Patient Dumping: A Proposal for Model Legislation, 
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 291, 334–35 (1993). See generally Danielle Sapega, Federal Code Blue: The 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act’s Prolonged Venture into Malpractice Law, 29 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 99 (2010). 
 64. Karns, supra note 1, at 365–66. 
 65. Id. at 366 (citing Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Burd v. Lebanon HMA, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902–06 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE “IMPROPER MOTIVE” ON THE AGING 
POPULATION 
The federal standard for appropriate medical screening should not 
include a motive requirement. First, demographics are evolving; the 
emergency department (ED) in particular is rapidly graying.68 Second, the 
medical screenings that older adults receive in an ED are extremely critical 
to their life expectancy and quality of life following a visit.69 Ultimately, 
requiring an improper motive would negatively impact an already 
vulnerable population by creating unnecessary obstacles to remedies. 
A. The Silver Context 
The Silver Tsunami will inevitably flood emergency departments 
across the country with 10,000 baby boomers turning sixty-five years old 
each day.70 The “Baby Boom” refers to births from 1946 to 1964 and has 
yet to show its full impact.71 During this period, which was post-World 
War II, approximately seventy-five million Americans were born.72 
Moreover, the population of older adults is expected to increase: the 
percentage of Americans sixty-five years or older was 13% in 2010 and is 
projected to be more than 20% by 2030.73 
Accordingly, “people ages sixty-five and older are the most likely to 
visit U.S. emergency departments”74 and disproportionately use more 
emergency services than any other age group.75 “Over 60 percent of 
hospital admissions for patients over the age of 65 come through the 
emergency department.”76 However, some programs focus on improving 
                                                     
 68. See As Baby Boomers Age, Projections Show an Increase in ED Visits and Subsequent 
Hospitalizations, WEST HEALTH, https://www.westhealth.org/resource/baby-boomers-age-
projections-show-increase-ed-visits-subsequent-hospitalizations/ [https://perma.cc/EJ3T-NFWD]. 
 69. See infra Section III(B). 
 70. Lisa Esposito, What Is a Geriatric Emergency Department?, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://health.usnews.com/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-09-28/what-is-a-geriatric-
emergency-department [https://perma.cc/79MM-FCBJ]. 
 71. Eric Berger, The Graying of America: The Impact of Aging Baby Boomers on Emergency 
Departments, 51 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 288, 288 (2008). 
 72. Sondra Williamson, Serving an Aging Population in a Changing Health Care Landscape, 
TEX. HOSP. ASS’N, May–June 2017, at 18. 
 73. JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, VICTORIA A. VELKOFF & HOWARD HOGAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2014).  
 74. Esposito, supra note 70. 
 75. Mark McClelland & Jeanne M. Sorrell, Enhancing Care of Older Adults in the Emergency 
Department: Old Problems and New Solutions, 53 J. PSYCHOL. NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 
18, 18–19 (2015). 
 76. Esposito, supra note 70. 
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ED care for older patients, which may help to reduce the chance of hospital 
admissions.77 
Nonetheless, the emergency medicine system is at risk. The 
increasing volume of older patients will place a “huge demand on the 
entire health care system.”78 According to Mr. Zia Agha, Chief Medical 
Officer at West Health Institute in San Diego, older adults in the ED must 
have all their needs thoroughly assessed, including medical and social 
problems.79 “When the bulk of your patients are elderly, it’s just a lot more 
time consuming,” said Lynne Grief, who holds a Ph.D. in Nursing and 
directs Emergency Services at Sarasota Memorial Healthcare System in 
Sarasota, Florida.80 “It’s definitely much more labor intensive.”81 
Thus, tending to more elderly patients in emergency departments can 
mean less productivity for hospital staff; older individuals require more 
attention and their presenting symptoms are often not as straightforward 
compared to younger patients.82 Overall, older patients usually need to 
have more diagnostic testing to attain effective answers.83 In addition, 
communication in the ED can often be difficult due to the high prevalence 
of cognitive impairment of elderly patients.84 
B. Importance of Medical Screening with Geriatric ED Patients 
Emergency Departments must adjust as baby boomers reach a 
geriatric status.85 Older adults, unsurprisingly, are vulnerable patients, and 
approximately 25% of older adults discharged from the ED return to 
                                                     
 77. HIA Guest Blog, Older Adult-Friendly Emergency Department Staff Help Reduce Hospital 
Admissions, J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.healthinaging.org/blog/older-adult-
friendly-emergency-department-staff-help-reduce-hospital-admissions/ [https://perma.cc/V7FT-
WSPN]. 
 78. Berger, supra note 71, at 289. 
 79. Making Emergency Rooms Geriatric-Friendly, STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/making-emergency-rooms-geriatric-friendly [https:// 
perma.cc/MGV6-GRH8]. 
 80. Berger, supra 71, at 289. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Tracy Hampton, Experts Predict Visits by Baby Boomers Will Soon Strain Emergency 
Departments, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2613, 2614 (2008). According to Dr. Bitondo Dyer, director of 
the Geriatric Medicine Division at the University of Texas Medical School in Houston, “Older people 
don’t present with diseases in the same ways that we’re taught in medical school.” Id. “For example, 
compared with their younger counterparts, older patients with pneumonia are less likely to have the 
typical hallmarks of fever and elevated white blood cell counts, and those with myocardial infarction 
are less likely to have chest pain.” Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See generally Joan Somes & Nancy Stephens Donatelli, Retrofitting an Emergency 
Department to Make It Geriatric Friendly, 43 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 472, 472–74 (2017). 
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hospitals within thirty days.86 Moreover, older adults will be the most 
heavily impacted group of people under EMTALA as a matter of numbers. 
For the geriatric population, the ED has a unique position in playing 
a role in improving care.87 Essentially, the ED is an “ever-increasing 
access point for medical care,” and it is placed at a crossroads between 
inpatient and outpatient care.88 The ED is essential. It “sets the stage” for 
subsequent care because it is the initial site of care for both inpatient and 
outpatient events.89 Screening in the ED is critical; more accurate 
diagnoses can make the following care for older patients much more 
effective.90 
The average ED geriatric patient stay is 20% longer than younger 
populations and uses 50% more lab and imaging services.91 In addition, 
geriatric ED patients are 400% more likely to require social services, and 
geriatric patients frequently leave the ED dissatisfied.92 “[O]ptimal 
outcomes are not consistently attained.”93 These outcomes could be due to 
the possibility that the modern emergency care management model is not 
a fit for geriatric adults.94 Overall, effective and reliable emergency 
medicine methods to improve post-ED geriatric outcomes face a number 
of challenges.95 
Older adults should receive proper, “appropriate” screening, but the 
daily ED crowding makes effective screening difficult for all 
populations.96 The most common priorities older ED patients raised were 
related to the accuracy and efficiency of the medical evaluation.97 These 
priorities should be considered by those attempting to improve the 
emergency care of older adults.98 Thus, the medical screening duty a 
hospital possesses is crucial as EDs are an important safety net and have a 
significant role in maintaining the health and safety of older adults.99 
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The Geriatric Task Force, which proposes guidelines for geriatric 
care, also finds screening to be specifically essential. In particular, when 
screening older adults, health care professionals must be especially 
cognizant of delirium.100 “Delirium is an emergency medical condition 
that is associated with an increased risk of morbidity and mortality,” and 
patients who are discharged from the ED with delirium are nearly three 
times more likely to die within three months—compared to those whom 
emergency physicians identify with delirium.101 
Approximately 1 in 10 older ED patients suffer from delirium.102 
However, emergency physicians recognize only a minority (16%–38%) as 
impaired.103 Despite the continuing evidence supporting this finding, very 
little has changed.104 “Older ED patients with delirium are still highly 
prevalent, poorly recognized, and frequently are discharged to home with 
inadequate planning and support.”105 
In addition to screening for delirium, emergency department tools 
exist for screening older adults to determine if they are at risk for falls106 
or elder abuse107—all of which reinforce the importance of screening in 
the ED. Grossly inadequate screening should not be deemed as 
“appropriate” screening under EMTALA; it should count as the failure to 
screen. Further, plaintiffs should not have to prove a hospital’s improper 
motive because it has the same harmful effect as “patient dumping,” which 
is what Congress intended to prevent with EMTALA.108 
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IV. STATUTORY REVISION TO EMTALA’S APPROPRIATE MEDICAL 
SCREENING 
The current EMTALA provision regarding “appropriate medical 
screening” has issues with its broad and ambiguous language.109 The 
standard for “appropriate medical screening” should move toward 
including some component of negligence in defining the term 
“appropriate.” Ideally, a statutory revision would consider a grossly 
deficient medical screening “not appropriate” and be deemed a “failure to 
screen” under the EMTALA. In addition, this revision would expressly 
eliminate any need for a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s motive and 
focus on the defendant’s actions. 
A. Issues with EMTALA’s Broad Language 
Shortly after Congress passed EMTALA, some physicians predicted 
that its effectiveness would be crippled by its vague definitions of 
“emergency care” and “stabilizationer.”110 While the physicians may have 
had other consequences in mind, they were right about one thing: the 
vagueness in the statute would create issues. However, courts have 
consistently been opposed to expanding EMTALA.111 Nonetheless, 
EMTALA does not define the phrase “appropriate medical screening 
examination” beyond stating that its purpose is to identify the “emergency 
medical condition”112 that has to be stabilized.113 It does not define what it 
is and, maybe even more importantly, what it is not. 
A recent commenter, Henna K. Pithia, expressed that the lack of a 
universally accepted definition for EMTALA’s “appropriate medical 
screening” is problematic because the way a court chooses to interpret it 
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will determine whether or not an emergency medical condition exists.114 
She finds it critical that “these terms be defined more precisely and 
consistently.”115 
State and federal courts are quite divided on how to apply EMTALA 
and “tug[] at the meaning of each provision.”116 Although all the courts 
appear to agree that EMTALA does not create a federal medical 
malpractice claim, one court has described “an uneasy intersection 
between EMTALA and state law medical negligence claims.”117 
Another commenter, George P. Smith (a professor of law at the 
Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.118), has also 
expressed disagreement with EMTALA’s overly vague language119: 
It has been suggested that EMTALA is ineffective because it has 
definitional flaws and enforcement shortcomings. Specifically, 
because the statute’s key words are either defined vaguely or not 
defined at all, courts juggle testimonies of medical experts and extract 
their own definitions. Oftentimes, the legislative history of EMTALA 
has been of value to judicial decisionmaking. . . . Judicial 
constructions of EMTALA’s language remain problematic because 
the courts must interpret the statute’s undefined terms and also apply 
those terms to a particular hospital’s practice.120 
The overly broad language gives too much room for interpretation 
and ultimately can lead to harmful interpretations—such as requiring a 
plaintiff to allege an improper motive for the failure to appropriately 
screen in the emergency department. 
B. Proposed Legislation for EMTALA’s Appropriate Medical Screening 
EMTALA should be looked at from a public health perspective in 
addition to case-by-case scenarios.121 Public health looks at population 
health rather than just individual well-being.122 “Appropriate medical 
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screening” in EMTALA is just a piece of the puzzle; what EMTALA 
should be accomplishing for the public is the picture the puzzle creates. 
But the screening piece should be used to better protect the aging 
populations. James Bentley (a Senior Vice President of the American 
Hospital Association) writes, “[EMTALA] has a bias of caring [for] the 
individual over the community[.]”123 Furthermore, Marlene Cimons (a 
health policy and science journalist124) applies this same idea to the aging 
ED population: 
[M]any emergency departments, while effective in dealing with acute 
problems, don’t always look at the big picture when it comes to older 
patients. This means comprehensive screening procedures to check 
all medications and health history, as well as conditions at home, with 
the aim of not having to admit them to the hospital.125 
The vagueness in the statute hurts plaintiffs the most. The ambiguity 
in the phrase “appropriate medical screening examination” has created 
significant judicial confusion.126 Even the court in Cleland declared the 
word “appropriate” to be “one of the most wonderful weasel words in the 
dictionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in the 
drafting of legislation.”127  Interpreting “appropriate” to contain a motive 
on the part of the hospital creates a barrier which impedes on caring for 
older adults needs—which will eventually be the dominating 
population.128 
If the “improper motive” expands, elderly patients will be 
significantly affected by the improper motive requirement as they are 
likely plaintiffs. However, EMTALA does not sufficiently protect elderly 
patients from being a victim of patient dumping.129 Patient dumping and 
access to health care are already prominent issues for older adults since 
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they are not usually economically productive.130 Generally, the elderly 
population is disproportionately impoverished as well as economically 
disadvantaged.131 Thus, to better protect the elderly and to strengthen 
EMTALA’s effectiveness—and to resolve the circuit split—Congress 
should clarify some of the statute’s definitions.132 
Some courts claim that EMTALA “is not a federal malpractice 
statute and it does not set a national emergency health care standard; 
claims of misdiagnosis or inadequate treatment are left to the state 
malpractice arena.”133 Further, screening can satisfy EMTALA even if 
there is a misdiagnosis.134 However, that does not mean there should be a 
near-impossible standard for plaintiffs to meet. 
While some proposals for “appropriate screening” move toward 
eliminating overlap between medical malpractice and EMTALA 
screening,135 this Comment proposes statutory language that would further 
overlap the two. Nevertheless, Beverly Cohen puts forward a worthy goal: 
“[T]o place control of enforcement back into the hands of the private 
individuals who were wronged in the first place.”136 A statutory revision 
to § 1395dd(a) should expand the statute to include §§ 1395dd(a)(1) 
and 1395dd(a)(2) and read as follows: 
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if 
any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this 
subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is 
made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a 
medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate 
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s 
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely 
available to the emergency department, to determine whether or not 
an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection 
(e)(1)) exists. 
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1) “Appropriate” shall not be read to require an individual to prove 
an intent or any type of motivation on the part of the hospital. The 
standard shall be construed as a strict-liability provision. 
2) A hospital’s gross deviation from the standard of care or grossly 
deficient screening shall be considered a failure to provide an 
appropriate medical screening. 
This language eliminates the possibility of a court interpreting an 
improper motive from an “appropriate medical screening” and allows the 
patient the fair opportunity to bring a case under EMTALA when he or 
she has received grossly deficient medical screening. This interpretation is 
a higher standard than ordinary professional negligence,137 yet provides a 
great protection for patients—and a greater protection for geriatric patients 
whose lives depend on effective screening. 
The text of the appropriate screening requirement, like the 
“stabilization” requirement as the Supreme Court pointed out in Roberts, 
does not strongly implicate an improper motive.138 Even under the 
majority standard, plaintiffs have difficulty achieving a case.139 But the 
Sixth Circuit adds an extra barrier, which is unnecessary and even renders 
the private right of action useless to most injured plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory revision provided in this Comment would better 
achieve Congress’s goal to prevent a type of “patient dumping.” While 
some commentators express concern of excessive litigation140 or view the 
rationale for the improper motive requirement as “[o]ne way of limiting 
the potentially sweeping scope of the statute’s language[,] . . .”141 effective 
patient dumping prevention is important. In the modern context, the Sixth 
Circuit’s interpretation makes inadequate and grossly deficient screening 
of an elderly person “appropriate,” forcing plaintiffs to prove a hospital’s 
improper motive in its failure to screen, a near-impossible standard to 
meet, has the same effect as kicking patients to the curb.142 
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Removing the obstacle of an improper motive for vulnerable 
plaintiffs and providing them with federal remedies for a grossly deficient 
screening does not suddenly transform EMTALA into a horrific 
federalized medical malpractice law. Rather, it protects the aging 
population, further encourages effective screening, and promotes 
nondiscrimination by stressing a truly “appropriate” medical screening 
standard for all patients. 
 
